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Introduction
Budgeting of various government sponsored programs, how to improve allocation and the
reach of tax dollars throughout the population, is an important policy question. To get a glimpse
into how to the government allocates tax dollars and, on a smaller scale, how the government
ensures that its citizens are better off with every passing year, I examine the operations of the
Division of Liens and Recovery in New York City.
The Division of Liens and Recovery deals with recouping money for Medicaid and
Public Assistance programs from clients who have gotten sponsored by these programs. Suppose
a person X sues the city and wins a settlement. This person has injuries that have been treated in
a hospital, and sometimes the hospital bills have been paid for by Medicaid. The city has then
overcompensated person X. This is because person X has received a settlement from the injuring
party, which was already meant to compensate for the injury related medical costs. The Division
of Liens deducts the medical injury related costs out of the client’s settlement amount. It does so
by placing liens on client’s settled cases from personal injury claims and law suits. Liens are
rights of payment from clients in the amount of their medical costs and public assistance. By
collecting from the settlement amount that is due to the client, the Division of Liens and
Recovery is ensuring that they are getting reimbursed for paying for the client’s medical costs
and that the client is not getting over compensated. For example, if the person who injured the
client owes the client money for the injury then they should pay for said client’s Medical costs
and Public Assistance that the client was receiving from the government back to the government.
The city is also considered an injured party because the defendant who injured the client thus
causes the city to pay out for the client’s medical care and Public Assistance. Hence, the
settlement amount is not considered the client’s money to begin with. The money first must be
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processed by the city so that they can recoup the payment for the client’s Medicaid and Public
Assistance that they paid to the client while the client was injured. Then, the remaining sum goes
to the said client. By collecting a lien, the city is not taking the client’s money. They are taking
the defendants money that was the defendant paid out for the client’s medical injury related
costs.

1.1 Background
To understand how and under what regulations the Division on Liens and Recovery
operates, it is important to understand what Medicaid and Public Assistance programs are and
their history. Medicaid was signed into law in 1965 by President Lyndon B Johnson and was
authorized by title XIX of the Social Security Act.1 It provides health coverage for low income
peoples in all the US states, the District of Columbia, and the US territories. Each state was given
the right to administer the program differently, even though Medicaid is jointly administered by
the states and federal government.2 Public Assistance, also known as Cash Assistance, was
created earlier than Medicaid. The beginnings of the welfare system that provided public
assistance can be traced back to the Social Security Act of 1935.3

Joseph D. Juenger, “In Light of Ahlborn - Designing State Legislation to Protect the Recovery of Medicaid
Expenses from Personal Injury Settlements,” 35 N. Ky. L. Rev, (2008): 107.
2
Ibid., 107.
3
"Origins of the State and Federal Public Welfare Programs (1932 – 1935)." Social Welfare History Project.
December 01, 2016. Accessed February 21, 2019. https://socialwelfare.library.vcu.edu/public-welfare/origins-ofthe-state-federal-public-welfare-programs/.
1
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For the purposes of this paper, an important change occurred in 1996, the welfare system
got changed to TANF and this is what it is known as today.4 TANF stands for Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families and is a federally administered program that allows states to
administer its own programs to assist the needy.5

New York, specifically, has many Public Assistance programs. For example, One Shot is
a program that that helps pay for bills in months of bad financial management. Another program,
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, SNAP, provides nutritional assistance to low
income families. All programs under Public Assistance are “payers of last resort” meaning that,
they help the needy when there is no other way for them to receive assistance. Similarly,
Medicaid is also a payer of last resort. Payers of last resort such as SNAP, TANF, and Medicaid
are allowed by law to recoup funds paid out to individuals on any of these programs who file for
a personal injury claim or suit.6

The Division of Liens and Recovery can collect on personal injury cases according to two
laws stated above, NYS SSL 104 and NYS SSL 104b. In its original form NYS SSL 104 was
passed in 1940.7 This law concerns recovering compensation from a person discovered to have
property or to have come into significant wealth who has previously received Public Assistance.
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Ibid., 1.
Ibid., 1.
6
Joseph D. Juenger, “In Light of Ahlborn - Designing State Legislation to Protect the Recovery of Medicaid
Expenses from Personal Injury Settlements,” 35 N. Ky. L. Rev, (2008): 107.
7
Michael A. Bottar, “Robbing Peter to Pay Paul: Medicaid Liens, Supplemental Needs Trusts and Personal Injury
Recoveries on Behalf of Infants in New York State Following the Gold Decision,” 53 Syracuse L. Rev. 175 (2003):
184.
5
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Since the client has been awarded a significant amount of money, this law allows for the
department to collect up to 10 years back in Public Assistance that was awarded to the client.
Under this law the department has the right to sue the client that is not willing to pay the
department for up to 10 years of Public Assistance that was provided to them.8 Similarly, NYS
SSL 104b allows the Division of Liens and Recovery to file liens against personal injury if the
recipient of the settlement is on Public Assistance (from the date of their accident to the
settlement date) and/or has medical care paid for by Medicaid that is related to the accident after
the date of the accident to the settlement date.9 The statute involving Medicaid was added into
law in 1964.10
Aside from the statutes, NYS SSL 104 and 104b, the applications for Medicaid and
Public Assistance programs have an “assignment clause” that states that when a client pursues
any personal injury claims they assign the resources they get to Medicaid. 11 This means that the
Division of Liens and Recovery has the right to place a lien on the client’s settlement amount up
to what was paid out in Medicaid or Public Assistance. Essentially, when applying for Medicaid
and Public Assistance the client agrees to the assignment clause during the application process
and acknowledges that he or she has given the department permission to file a lien on any
medical injury law suit or claim that they bring up.

8

"2014 New York Laws :: SOS - Social Services :: Article 3 - LOCAL PUBLIC WELFARE ORGANIZATION;
POWERS AND DUTIES :: Title 6 - (101 - 111) POWERS TO ENFORCE SUPPORT :: 104 - Recovery from a
Person Discovered to Have Property." Justia Law. Accessed February 21, 2019. https://law.justia.com/codes/newyork/2014/sos/article-3/title-6/104/.
9
"2014 New York Laws :: SOS - Social Services :: Article 3 - LOCAL PUBLIC WELFARE ORGANIZATION;
POWERS AND DUTIES :: Title 6 - (101 - 111) POWERS TO ENFORCE SUPPORT :: 104-B - Liens for Public
Assistance and Care on Claims and Suits for Personal Injuries." Justia Law. Accessed February 21, 2019.
https://law.justia.com/codes/new-york/2014/sos/article-3/title-6/104-b/.
10
Michael A. Bottar, “Robbing Peter to Pay Paul: Medicaid Liens, Supplemental Needs Trusts and Personal Injury
Recoveries on Behalf of Infants in New York State Following the Gold Decision,” 53 Syracuse L. Rev. 175 (2003):
185.
11
Ibid., 108.
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Overall, in New York City, the recovery of money paid out to clients after a personal
injury case settles is an interesting topic to investigate because it provides insight into how the
government functions on a basic city level. It also allows for extensive data analysis in hopes of
tracking patterns of possible improvements that can be made to the functions of the Division of
Liens and Recovery which will increase monetary recoupments and hence the welfare of the city.
Essentially, the objective of writing this paper is to use the knowledge gained and extrapolate it
to other lien and recovery departments increasing the social benefit among the dwellers of other
states.

1.2 The Question
This research paper is concerned with finding which factors lead to recoupment and
which factors explain recoupment amounts with the overarching objective to use the analysis in
order to understand which variables increase reimbursement funds that will be reinjected into
Medicaid and Public Assistance programs. This study meassures the client and firm
characteristics such as the settlement amount of their case, their age, how long the case has been
in the MAESTRO system for, the client’s borough of residence, and the defending law firm’s
location in order to see if a specific client and or firm characteristics impact the amount of
recoupment. MAESTRO is the name of the analytical tool that all the data is gathered in.
Additionally, the firm’s names will be used to track whether specific firms have effects on
recoupment amounts. Ultimately, modeling this information and interpreting the results can help
create public policy that will help the city recoup and recover more money from settled personal
injury cases and pave a path for better money management of the Medicaid program.

2 Literature Review

5

While looking for articles to review related to the question at hand, it has become clear
that this type of research has not yet been done. The articles that I did find fell into three
categories. These articles either compared recoupment language among states, explained the
need for a recoupment and compared Medicaid and Medicare recoupment processes.
Additionally, studies on litigation and bargaining and how to conduct negotiations are plentiful
and although the tactics will not be discussed in this paper having a strategy when negotiating is
worth mentioning because it does speak on the Division of Liens and Recovery collection
abilities. In, “Effective Legal Negotiation and Settlement” by (Craver 2009), it is explained that
simply practicing and interacting with clients does not make one a great negotiator and only
hours of negotiation practice can make a good negotiator.12 Meaning that, the art of negotiation
should be taught to analysts so that they can negotiate with attorneys higher recoupment amounts
and increase the reimbursements to the Division. Ultimately, although there are no articles that
describe similar data analytics to what I want to perform, these articles lead in the general
direction of answering the question of how to improve the collection process of Medicaid; this
question is one of the driving sources for my research.

2.1 Comparing Recoupment Among States
“In Light of Ahlborn - Designing State Legislation to Protect the Recovery of Medicaid
Expenses from Personal Injury Settlements,” (Juenger 2008), describes a personal injury case in
Arkansas and illustrates the similarity of wording on recovering medical costs between
Oklahoma and New York, showing that New York is not different in its recovery tactics. In this
personal injury lawsuit, a 19-year-old college student, Heidi Ahlborn, was injured in an
automobile accident and left permanently brain damaged. The state of Arkansas paid almost

12

Charles B. Craver, “Effective Legal Negotiation and Settlement,” PDF, (1986): 9.
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$216,000 to medical providers on her behalf. When she later sued the injurer, the state tried to
recoup that $216,000. However, Ahlborn only settled for $550,000 and argued that the amount
was only 1/6 of what she should have received in the settlement, so the government should only
charge her 1/6 of the $216,000 medical bill. She won the case and the government recovered
approximately $36,000.13 This Arkansas case has demonstrated the importance of assignment of
rights to recoup Medicaid funds and allowed for other states like Oklahoma to go a step further
by placing a lien on the injurer, “Per session law, Oklahoma expressly seeks to continue to
employ liens to recover Medicaid expenditures from third-party tortfeasors.”14 Placing a lien
insures and promotes that the Medicaid expenditures will be paid back and re-injected into the
plan to help cover the costs of other Medicaid users. Similarly, the wording of the law in
Oklahoma is similar to the wording of New York law; in New York, the law is written “[anyone
who]…has a ‘lien’ on any third-party recoveries where medical expenses have been paid by
Medicaid.”15 This demonstrates that New York is not the only state that has a recoupment
process and that New York’s wording when it comes to state’s right to collect a lien is not unique
and unheard of. Thus, the similar wording that allows for recoupment of funds to be reinjected
into the Medicaid budget illustrates each state’s approach to be able to provide health services
for those who need them.
Similarly to Oklahoma, Virginia’s provisions also mirror those of New York.16 In,
“Robbing Peter to Pay Paul: Medicaid Liens, Supplemental Needs Trusts and Personal Injury

Joseph D. Juenger, “In Light of Ahlborn - Designing State Legislation to Protect the Recovery of Medicaid
Expenses from Personal Injury Settlements,” 35 N. Ky. L. Rev, (2008): 107.
14
Ibid., 117.
15
Ibid., 116.
16
Michael A. Bottar, “Robbing Peter to Pay Paul: Medicaid Liens, Supplemental Needs Trusts and Personal Injury
Recoveries on Behalf of Infants in New York State Following the Gold Decision,” 53 Syracuse L. Rev. 175 (2003):
203.
13
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Recoveries on Behalf of Infants in New York State Following the Gold Decision,” Michael A.
Bottar explains that in Virginia’s law, “Section 8.01-66.9 provides that when the Commonwealth
pays for or provides medical services because of a tortious injury, a lien is created in favor of the
Commonwealth for the amount of those services. The lien is placed against a future personal
injury recovery brought by a Medicaid recipient or their representative.”17 In other words, the
state of Virginia, like New York, is allowed to place a lien to recoup medical costs paid out on
behalf of a Medicaid client. Nonetheless, the two states are not entirely similar in their provisions
because, “the Medicaid reimbursement scheme under Virginia Code section 8.01-66.9 is
considerably more flexible than the statutory recovery provisions of New York's Social Services
Law.”18 Although the two states mirror each other in language for recovery purposes and impose
liens some states are more discretionary when it comes to how much they are willing to negotiate
and reduce that lien for the injured client. Thus, there is a tradition in several states of trying to
recover funds that can be used to further the interests of society.

2.2 Why Recoupments Are Necessary
“An Examination of the Personal Injury Plaintiff's Struggle for Adequate Compensation
under Government Rights of Reimbursement,” by (Smith 2013), answers why there is a need for
recovery and outlines a plan of how to increase the benefit of tax dollars. Understanding why
there is a need for recovery allows for a passageway to improve collection methods which in turn
increases reinjection back into Medicaid. Kaitlin M. Smith, says that, “rights of reimbursement
held by the government under these programs provide two main functions in society; they allow
the government to provide immediate care to an injured plaintiff who cannot afford medical care

17
18

Ibid., 203.
Ibid., 205.
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up front, as well as safeguarding taxpayers from an increased financial burden.”19 The collection
of recoupments and Medicaid itself are necessary because by reinjecting funds back into
Medicaid these recoupments, in part, ensure that everyone in the society is covered if a Medical
injury happens to them. Smith goes further to suggest a bifurcated process of collection during
trials in which evidence is presented in the initial phase of the trial and then the jury decides if
the defendant is liable. If the defendant is liable, the jury then decides how much they should
payback the government based on the calculated damages amount.20 This process will allow for a
quicker repayment to the government because the lien amount will be calculated prior to the trial
and the defendant will know how much he has to pay back to the government. Therefore, the
defendant will be making the direct payment to the government without the money reaching the
client first. Moreover, the process will not make the injured plaintiff feel as if the repayment of
their medical care is being taken out of their settlement amount. Although this is a good
suggestion, there is no data or testing done on whether such a method would work to better the
recoupment process. Smith uses hypothetical scenarios to suggest that this method would work.
This a good start in thinking of how to make the system function better, and to open up the study
of increasing Medicaid recoupments.

2.3 Comparing Medicaid and Medicare Recoupments
“Giving an Inch, Then Taking a Mile: How the Government's Unrestricted Recovery of
Conditional Medicare Payments Destroys Plaintiffs' Chances at Compensation through the Tort
System,” by (Miklos 2010), compares Medicaid and Medicare collection processes in order to
demonstrate how rigid collection systems can damage clients’ chances of being compensated

Kaitlin M. Smith, “An Examination of the Personal Injury Plaintiff's Struggle for Adequate Compensation under
Government Rights of Reimbursement,” 22 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y (2013): 270.
20
Ibid., 296.
19
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under Medicare. This has strong implications for Medicaid because Medicaid is also a
government funded program. Increasing reimbursements is debated by Miklos to decrease
overall just compensation. She argues that, “allowing the government full recovery from
settlements makes Medicare beneficiaries undesirable clients for medical malpractice attorneys
because it reduces their net recovery. Plaintiffs' attorneys will only agree to representation when
they believe it is profitable to do so.”21 Essentially, if the government can recover the entire
amount of the settlement the plaintiff will have no incentive to sue at all. This is comparable in
the Medicaid situation because although we are researching how to increase Medicaid collections
it should be taken into account that extremely high recoupments can lead to clients not suing,
plaintiff attorneys not taking cases and Medicaid not being able to recover anything at all.
Comparing the full recovery of Medicare as opposed to limited recovery of Medicaid provides
useful insight into policy implementation of increased Medicaid recoupments while maintaining
balance and not isolating clients from having their cases heard.

3 Data
The MAESTRO system is the primary data source for the analysis. The data is gathered on
all cases that were settled from the year 2014 to 2018. We are only provided with cases that were
opened and closed in the MAESTRO system between zero to four years. The primary dependent
variable is Payment, and it is a continuous variable that represents the amount that the
department was paid, or in other words, the recoupment amount. This recoupment amount
includes recoupments from Medicaid and Public Assistance. Throughout the paper, the Payment
variable will be referred to as the “recoupment amount” and should not be confused with the

Nicole Miklos, “Giving an Inch, Then Taking a Mile: How the Government's Unrestricted Recovery of
Conditional Medicare Payments Destroys Plaintiffs' Chances at Compensation through the Tort System,” 84 St.
John's L. Rev. 305 (2010): 320.
21
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recoup variable. The recoup variable is a binary variable created to represent 1 if there is a
recoupment and 0 if there is not a recoupment.
The independent variables consist of client characteristics and the client’s representing law
firm characteristics: the client’s settlement amount divided by 10,000 for ease of interpretation,
client’s age, the borough the client lives in, how long the case was open in the MAESTRO
system, the law firms’ location by borough, and the law firm names. The independent client
characteristic variables are labeled as Settleby100, AgeAll, BoroughCode, O2CAll,
FrimBorough and FirmNameCode, respectively. Settleby100, AgeAll, and O2CAll are measured
continuously while the remaining variables are measured nominally or categorically.
BoroughCode is a categorical variable and is split into groups. Each borough is assigned a
number one through five and these numbers are collapsed into Borough dummy variables. The
other independent variables are firm characteristics which consist of the firm’s name that is
linked to each individual case and the borough in which that firm operates. The variables are
labeled as FirmNameCode and FirmBoro respectively. There are 1539 unique law firms, so each
firm is assigned a number from 1 to 1539. There are fewer firms than cases, because some firms
handled more than one case. To measure the location of the attorney’s law firm, each the
borough from which the law firm originates is also assigned a number in the same manner as the
location of the client’s addresses. The only difference between the client’s and the law firm’s
addresses is that if a law firm is located outside the five boroughs then that law firm gets
assigned a number six. Since New York City only recoups payments for clients from the five
boroughs it makes sense that each client’s address is assigned a number one through five.
However, New York City does not limit the location to which the client’s law firm can be from
hence, there is an added category labeled with the number six, for firms that are outside the five
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boroughs. Ultimately, the client characteristics and the law firm characteristics are used to
predict whether there will be a recoupment or not and if there is a recoupment then how much
will be recouped.
The summary statistics are presented in the first two tables. From the first table we can see
that there is a total of 9,521 observations and approximately 43.3% of those cases had a
recoupment. The average recoupment amount is $8,094. The minimum recoupment amount was
$419.4 while the maximum was $600,000. The average age for a client was approximately 48
years old. The average time a case was open in the MAESTRO system was one year. The
minimum settlement amount was $850 and the maximum was $22 million. The average
settlement amount was around $129,000. From table 2 we can see that there was a total of 1,187
clients who live in Manhattan and a total of 4,497 firms operating in Manhattan. We can also
observe that there were 693 cases with clients who lived in Manhattan and had representing law
firms in Manhattan as well. We can also see that 81 cases had clients from Manhattan and their
representing law firms from Brooklyn. The average recoupment amount seems to be small, less
than 10% of the settlement amount. The rest of the summary data can be interpreted in a similar
fashion.

4 Methodology
To complete the analysis, this paper uses ordinary least squares, fixed effects modeling,
Probit, and Heckman. The regression and Probit treats recoupment amounts and the recoupment
decisions separately, while Heckman allows them to be interdependent. The first model is a
simple linear regression, regressing payment on client characteristics and client’s law firm
characteristics such as settlement amount, client’s age, length of time the client’s case has been
in the MAESTRO system, the borough in which the client lives in, and the firm’s borough. Three
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types of basic regressions are performed. The first regression includes client characteristics and
excludes the client boroughs and law firm locations. The second regression includes all the client
characteristics and excludes law firm locations. The third regression includes all the client and
law firm characteristics. This is done in order to see if the borough codes and the law firm
locations add anything interesting to the models.
The second model in this paper is a fixed effects model which is used to control for law
firm characteristics in order to see if controlling for law firm characteristics would change the
effect of the client characteristics on recoupment amount. There are 1539 unique law firms so
dummy variables are created for each unique firm name. Due to the multitude of dummy
variables pertaining to each unique firm, the “areg” command is used. A lot of these dummies
just drop out if the firm has only handled one case, hence, allowing firms with multiple cases to
be different with the single case firms as the base group. The third model, an addition to the
second model, analyzes the firm codes by their frequency of cases in order to understand whether
specific law firms contribute to lower recoupment amounts. Dummy variables are created for law
firms that have a frequency of greater than fifty firms matching the same firm code. The number
fifty is used because it is thought that law firms with over fifty cases are perhaps more used to
dealing with litigating recoupments and paying out less to Medicaid, so it might be that
recoupment amounts are lower in these cases. With the created dummies, these additional
variables are added into the regression with client characteristics to try to identify firms that
consistently either increase or decrease the recoupment amount. Three regressions are performed
and each regression includes the same variables as the three regressions in the OLS models,
described above, with the addition of the dummy variables.
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The fourth model that is estimated is a Probit model which estimates the probability of
recoupment as a function of case characteristics. The same variables are used in this model as in
the previously described OLS model. Also, three Probit models are run in the same manner as
three OLS models without the location variables and then adding the location variables. These
regressions are run in order to see if adding client location and firm location ads any interesting
information to the model. However, in the Probit model, marginal effects are also estimated in
order to make interpretations.
These four simple models are good starting points. However, results from linear
regressions tend to be biased because we are not observing the equation for the entire population;
not all cases have received a recoupment/payment. Using a regular regression in this case might
cause sample selection bias. To avoid sample selection bias, I use the Heckman model. The first
stage of the Heckman is estimated using a Probit and measures whether there is a recoupment or
not. Then the inverse mills ratio, or lambda, is calculated and used in the second stage as an
additional independent variable. The second stage is then estimated by linear regression. With
the Heckman model we measure if the Division of Liens and recovery receives a recoupment,
then how much will the recoupment be. The model allows correlation between the amount of
recoupment and whether or not any recoupment is observed. The marginal effects are then
calculated in order to be able to interpret the coefficients. The Heckman model is calculated as is
and with the “twostep” command in order to demonstrate the likeness of the results, that the
model can be calculated in two different ways, and to fit regression models with selection.22 It is
typical to have some variables that are in the Probit that are not in the regression equation when

“Heckman- Heckman Selection Model,” PDF file. Accessed April 19, 2019.
https://www.stata.com/manuals13/rheckman.pdf.
22
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estimating a Heckman model. I use all the variables in both models and relying on the functional
form to identify the model. Overall, OLS, fixed effects, Probit, and Heckman, are utilized in
order to complete this analysis.

5 Results
Table 3 shows the three OLS regressions. The first one does not include any borough/
location variables for either the client or the law firm. All things held constant, recoupment
amount is on average $3,041. The only significant variable is the settlement amount. Meaning
that, a one dollar increase in settlement amount leads to an approximately $0.02 increase in
recoupment amount. In the second regression, where the client boroughs are added, the
settlement amount is still significant with the same coefficient, making the analysis for that
variable the same as the model without the client boroughs. Additionally, Bronx and Staten
Island are boroughs which have significant coefficients in this model. Compared to clients who
live in Manhattan, clients who live in the Bronx have on average $2,036 more in recoupment
amount. Compared to clients who live in Manhattan, clients who live in Staten Island have on
average $3,197 less in recoupment amount. The constant decreases in the second model to
$2,260 being the average recoupment amount all else held constant. The r-squared increases
from 0.32 to 0.323 from model one to model two which can be interpreted as the borough
coefficients not adding a lot to the explanatory power to the model. In the third regression model
we add the law firm’s location characteristics. The third OLS model also has the same significant
coefficients on settlement amount and thus the same interpretation as the previous two models.
Bronx and Staten Island are still significant. Compared to clients who live in Manhattan, clients
who live in the Bronx have on average $1,922 more in recoupment amount. Compared to clients
who live in Manhattan, clients who live in Staten Island have on average $3,896 less in
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recoupment amount. The constant decreases in the third model, to $2,027, being the average
recoupment amount all else held constant. The r-squared in this model increases by only 0.001
and none of the law firm locations are significant which signals that adding them into the model
does not create a big difference in the accuracy of the model.
Table 4 shows the results of the fixed effects model; it is a regression using the “areg”
command. All things held constant, and accounting for law firm fixed effects, recoupment
amount is on average $2,089 according to this model. The significant variables are settlement
amount and how long the case was open in the MAESTRO system for. The difference between
the fixed effect model and the regular regression is that now, how long the case was open in the
system for, O2CAll, has a significant effect and can be meaningfully interpreted. A one dollar
increase in settlement amount leads to an approximate $0.02 increase in recoupment amount,
controlling for law firm fixed effects. Or to be more specific a $10,000 increase in the settlement
amount leads to an approximate $200 increase in recoupment amount. This is essentially the
same result as using the regular regression without having law firm fixed effects. Moreover, a
one- year increase in the length the case stays open in the system leads to a $728 increase in
recoupment amount, controlling for law firm fixed effects. Essentially, the coefficients did not
change significantly so controlling for law firm fixed effects did not create a better model.
The results in Table 5 show that all the dummy variables created on law firm names
based on their assigned codes were insignificant. In other words, creating these dummy variables
and adding them to the OLS model did not have any significant effects on increasing or
decreasing recoupment amount. The coefficients did change slightly from the regular OLS model
but not enough to have a different effect than the OLS model showed. This first regression with
law firm name dummy variables shows that all things held constant, recoupment amount is on
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average $3,455.124. The only significant variable is the settlement amount which means that a
one dollar increase in settlement amount leads to an approximately $0.02 increase in recoupment
amount. Or, for every $10,000 increase in the settlement amount the recoupment amount
increases by approximately $200. In the second regression, where the client boroughs are added
in, the settlement amount is still significant with almost the same coefficient, making the analysis
for that variable the same as the model without the client boroughs. Comparatively to the regular
regression model, Bronx and Staten Island, client boroughs, are boroughs which have significant
coefficients. Compared to clients who live in Manhattan, clients who live in the Bronx have on
average $2,117 more in recoupment amount. Compared to clients who live in Manhattan, clients
who live in Staten Island have on average $3,376 less in recoupment amount. The constant
decreases in the second model with law firm dummy variables to $2,588 being the average
recoupment amount all else held constant. The r-squared increases from 0.321 to 0.324 from
model one to model two which can be interpreted as the borough coefficients not adding a lot to
the explanatory power to the model. In the third model with law firm dummy variables the law
firm’s location characteristics are added. This model has significant coefficients on settlement
amount as the regular OLS model and thus the same interpretation as the previous two models
applies. Bronx and Staten Island client boroughs are still significant. Compared to clients who
live in Manhattan, clients who live in the Bronx have on average $2,027 more in recoupment
amount. Compared to clients who live in Manhattan, clients who live in Staten Island have on
average $3,748 less in recoupment amount. The constant decreases in the third model, to $2,363,
being the average recoupment amount all else held constant. The r-squared in this model
increases by only 0.001 and none of the law firm locations are significant which signals that
adding them into the model does not create a big difference in the accuracy of the model. Table 6
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is created to show the exact effect each law firm dummy variable has on recoupment amount,
however, since none of the dummy variables is significant, Table 3 is presented first and
simplifies the dummy variables into one effect.
In Table 7 I present results from the estimation of the Probit model. This model predicts
whether there will be a recoupment or not. The first Probit equation does not include any
borough/ location variables for either the client or the law firm. The second equation includes
borough variables of the client but not location variables for the law firm. The third equation
includes everything, borough variables from the client and from the law firm. The coefficients
are not easily interpretable, so the marginal effects, labeled in columns 4, 5 and 6 are used to
make interpretations. In the first model, the settlement amount, age of the client, and how long
the case was in the system for are significant variables that carry a meaningful interpretation. For
every $10,000 increase in the Settlement Amount the likelihood of recoupment increases by 0.7
percent. A one-year increase in age increases the probability of recoupment by 0.3 percent. A
one-year increase in the length the case is open in the MAESTRO system increase the
probability of recoupment by 8.3 percent. In the second version of the Probit model, when the
client boroughs are added, it is observed that Brooklyn, Queens and Staten Island have
significant effects on the probability of recoupment. Compared to clients who live in Manhattan,
clients that are from Brooklyn have a 7.9 percent lower likelihood of recoupment. Compared to
clients who live in Manhattan, clients that are from Queens have a 13.7 percent lower probability
of recoupment. Compared to clients who live in Manhattan, clients that are from Staten Island
have a probability of 13.1 percent lower recoupment. In the third Probit model, where law firm
boroughs are added, we can see that law firms that are located in Brooklyn, Bronx, Queens,
Staten Island and outside of New York City have a significant effect on whether there is a
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recoupment or not. Compared to law firms that are located in Manhattan, law firms that located
in Brooklyn, Bronx, Queens and Staten Island decrease the probability of recoupment by 5.3,
7.7, 10.8, and 7.4 percent respectively. Compared to law firms that are located in Manhattan, law
firms that are located outside of New York City increase the probability of recoupment by 3.6
percent respectively. The differences across the boroughs might be because law firms outside the
five boroughs are more willing to pay recoupments in order to avoid law suits. These firms might
be smaller than New York City law firms and less willing to risk being shut down due to a large
lawsuit.
Table 8 demonstrates the results of the Heckman model. Marginal effects are once again
needed to make an interpretation. It is shown that, the settlement amount of the case, the client’s
age, how long the case was open in the system for, client boroughs such as Brooklyn and
Queens, and law firm locations such as Brooklyn, Bronx, Queens and Staten Island are
significant. What this means is that, given that there is a recoupment, for every $10,000 increase
in the settlement amount the recoupment increases by $151. Additionally, per $10,000 increase
in settlement amount, chances of recoupment go up by 0.01 or 1%. The average marginal effect
on age can be interpreted as, given that there is a recoupment, a one-year increase in age
decreases the recoupment amount by $133. With a year increase in age, the likelihood of
recoupment goes up by 0.2%. Furthermore, conditional on there being a recoupment with every
year that the case is in the MAESTRO system, there is a decrease in recoupment amount by
$3248. Given that there is a recoupment, clients that live in Brooklyn and Queens, as compared
to clients that live in Manhattan, increase the recoupment amount by $2,299 and $4,463
respectively. Given that there is a recoupment, law firms that are located in Brooklyn, Bronx,
Queens and Staten Island increase the recoupment amount by $2,759, $4,877, $5,236, and
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$6,421 respectively. Firms that are located outside New York City increase the probability of
recoupment by 3%.
Table 9 illustrates the results of the Heckman model performed in two parts. It is
illustrated that the settlement amount of the case, the client’s age, how long the case was open in
the system for, client boroughs such as Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten Island and all law firm
locations are significant. In other words, given that there is a recoupment, a $10,000 increase in
the settlement amount increases the recoupment amount by $140. Also, per $10,000 increase in
settlement amount, chances of recoupment go up by 0.6%. The average marginal effect on age
can be interpreted as, a one-year increase in age increases the recoupment amount by 0.3%.
Additionally, conditional on there being a recoupment, with every year that the case is in the
MAESTRO system, there is a decrease in recoupment amount by $1,941. Given that there is a
recoupment, clients that live in the Bronx, and Queens, as compared to clients that live in
Manhattan, increase the recoupment amount by $1,665 and $3,002 respectively. Given that there
is a recoupment, law firms that are located in the Bronx, Queens and Staten Island increase the
recoupment amount by $4,042, $2,681, and $5,900 respectively. All the law firms within NYC
compared to law firms that are in Manhattan decrease the chances of recoupment. Law firms
located outside NYC increase the chances of recoupment by 3.5%. Comparing the results both
Heckman models gives a similar conclusion that age and how long the case was in the system for
decreases recoupment amounts while law firms that are located in the Bronx and Staten Island
increases recoupment amount.

The estimates of the Heckman relative to the estimates of the simple regressions and
Probit are different, this can be observed in the tables. For example, in the OLS model a ten
thousand dollar increase in the settlement amount leads to an approximate $169 increase in
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recoupment amount. Similarly, in the Probit model for every $10,000 increase in the Settlement
Amount the likelihood of recoupment increases. Comparative to the OLS and Probit model, in
the Heckman model, when there is a ten thousand dollar increase in the settlement amount the
recoupment amount increases by $151. In that same OLS model we saw that clients who live in
the Bronx compared to clients who live in Manhattan increase recoupment amount. While clients
who live in State Island decrease recoupment amount. This similar pattern was observed in the
fixed effects model and the model where dummy variables are created to track the specific
effects of law firms on recoupment amounts. Also, in the Heckman model, the client’s law firm
location in most of the boroughs tends to increase the recoupment amount where as in the OLS
and Probit models being located in one of the four boroughs compared to Manhattan tends to
either decrease or increase recoupment amount and the probability of recoupment. After
analyzing multiple models, the Heckman model is a superior model when compared to the OLS
and Probit models. These different results go to show that sample selection is important and
hence the Heckman model should be used because it accounts for such sample selection.

6 Discussion
After performing multiple analysis, it becomes evident that based on the data it cannot be
predicted which law firm should be targeted in order to increase recoupment amounts; however,
client characteristics and law firm locations are good indicators to look for when working on a
case. Throughout the models, Settlement Amount was consistently an important factor in
determining there being a recoupment and an increased amount in recoupment. This makes
logical sense because the higher the settlement amount is, the more serious a person’s injury
could have been where they were required to use Medicaid which would qualify the settlement
amount to be eligible for recoupment. The age of the client and how long that client’s case was
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in the MAESTRO system also came up as significant variables. This can be explained with the
fact that the younger people, especially children born with disabilities due to malpractice have
higher settlements and require more Medicaid coverage. If Medicaid provides those people with
more coverage than they are more likely to recoup those larger sums when the injured client
receives a settlement. An explanation to why the length of the case in the system is significant is
because the longer the case stays in the system, the more likely it is that some medical charges
might be disputed as not being related to the accident thus, decreasing the eligible recoupment
amount. Overall, as a policy suggestion, it would make sense to have the more experienced
analysts, in the Division of Liens and Recovery, to be first given cases that have high settlement
amounts with people who are younger and live in Queens with their representing attorneys
working in Staten Island. The chief conclusion being that the relationship between settlement
amount and recoupment amount seems stable and the two cents on the dollar rule holds up. At
this current time the experienced analysts get assigned the high value or high settlement amount
cases, but the age and location of the clients and their law firms are not accounted for. If the
cases with characteristics described above are prioritized and assigned to the senior analysts, the
department should see an increase in recoupments and recoupment amounts.

Although a lot of analysis was performed in this study there are still a few limitations.
One limitation is that the data that was available was only for the 2014-2018 years. A bigger data
set could have shown more interesting results and potentially tracked patterns with law firms that
were causing the department to lose money. Another limitation is that data on law firms was
extremely limited to the name of the law firm and their location by borough. If there was more
data available on the size of the law firm, the length of time this law firm was in business for,
and etc more interesting variables could be added an observed within the model. Additionally,
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since law firms and clients aren’t the only “players” in the recoupment process, if data on the
analysts was available then this study could analyze which analysts were causing increases or
decreases in the recoupment amount given that there was a recoupment. In summary, due to
regulations and safety of clients, law firms and analysts the research was limited yet still
provided useful insight.

7 Conclusion
This study provided useful insight and potential suggestions to increasing the
reimbursement of government paid out funds to cover Medicaid’s recipient’s medical injury
related costs. It is concluded that senior analysts should be assigned cases with high settlement
amounts and clients who are younger and live in Queens with their representing attorneys
working in Staten Island. The next step would be for the Division of Liens and Recovery to
create a tool that would do such prioritization and automatically assign cases to analysts based on
their rank and based on the client’s and law firm’s characteristics. An interesting project going
forward would be for the department to start collecting more data on law firms like how many
employees each law firm has, and how long these law firms have been around for and etc. Also,
to collect more information on the analysts and have it input in the MAESTRO system in order
to increase the analyzing potential, increase recoupments, increase recoupment amounts and
increase overall benefit to society. This paper worked with data that although was limited, helped
pave a great starting point to analyzing government agencies and maximizing the efficiency of
such agencies while creating a better society for the future generations to come.
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List of Tables
Summary Statistics Table 1
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

N

Mean

Sd

Min

Max

Payment

4,120

8,094

22,916

419.4

600,000

Age

9,521

48.10

17.94

2.151

104.1

Open to Close

9,521

0.980

0.965

0

3.989

Settlement Amount

9,521

128,694

532,011

850

2.200e+07

Recoupment

9,521

0.433

0.495

0

1

VARIABLES

Summary Statistics Table 2
(1)
Manhattan
Freq
Firm Borough (Percent)

Manhattan
Brooklyn
Bronx
Queens
Staten Island
Outside NYC

Total

(2)
Brooklyn
Freq
(Percent)

(3)
Bronx
Freq
(Percent)

(4)
Queens
Freq
(Percent)

(5)
Staten Island
Freq
(Percent)

693***
(58.38)
81***
(6.824)
76***
(6.403)
117***
(9.857)
16***
(1.348)
204***
(17.19)

1,380***
(45.63)
905***
(29.93)
67***
(2.216)
236***
(7.804)
39***
(1.290)
397***
(13.13)

1,413***
(54.22)
159***
(6.101)
368***
(14.12)
205***
(7.866)
16***
(0.614)
445***
(17.08)

878***
(38.22)
191***
(8.315)
27***
(1.175)
718***
(31.26)
11***
(0.479)
472***
(20.55)

133***
(32.68)
47***
(11.55)
6***
(1.474)
24***
(5.897)
158***
(38.82)
39***
(9.582)

4,497

1187

3024

2606

2297

407

9,521
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Total

1,383
544
1,300
240
1,557

OLS Regressions
VARIABLES
Settlement Amount
Age
Open to Close

(1)
Payment

(2)
Payment

(3)
Payment

168.431***
(3.867)
9.429
(17.222)
339.972
(307.673)

168.888***
(3.865)
12.809
(17.274)
360.748
(307.307)
-80.379
(933.857)
2,036.489**
(929.895)
419.415
(1,005.429)
-3,197.489*
(1,694.064)

3,040.711***
(1,011.681)

2,260.390*
(1,268.348)

168.599***
(3.879)
14.889
(17.319)
367.338
(307.588)
200.654
(950.518)
1,922.007**
(933.746)
600.543
(1,021.120)
-3,896.172**
(1,830.008)
-1,130.995
(970.541)
1,949.586
(1,357.585)
-986.757
(1,066.871)
3,137.153
(2,366.868)
692.946
(788.096)
2,026.829
(1,292.336)

Brooklyn
Bronx
Queens
Staten Island
Firm- Brooklyn
Firm- Bronx
Firm- Queens
Firm- Staten Island
Firm- Not in NYC
Constant

Observations
R-squared

4,120
4,120
0.320
0.323
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4,120
0.324

Table 3: OLS regressions of Payment on Settlement amount. Payment is measured in dollar
amounts. Model (2) includes a client borough identifier and Model (3) includes a client borough
identifier as well as a law firm location identifier.
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Fixed Effects Regression
(1)
Payment

VARIABLES
Settlement Amount
Age
Open to Close
Brooklyn
Bronx
Queens
Staten Island
Firm - Brooklyn
Firm - Bronx
Firm - Queens
Firm – Staten Island
Firm – Not NYC
Constant

162.840***
(5.106)
25.657
(20.873)
727.697**
(369.777)
717.198
(1,147.926)
2,532.051**
(1,146.936)
1,203.560
(1,254.578)
-5,622.689**
(2,291.097)
-2,662.979
(5,541.379)
545.937
(6,731.569)
-2,648.795
(5,113.879)
4,329.184
(10,680.608)
-1,115.331
(3,239.966)
1,524.585
(2,223.975)

Observations
4,120
R-squared
0.501
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Results when accounting for law firm fixed effects.
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Regressions with Condensed Firm Code Dummy Variables
VARIABLES
Settlement Amount
Age
Open to Close

(1)
Payment

(2)
Payment

(3)
Payment

167.610***
(3.840)
8.560
(17.421)
308.890
(311.345)

168.161***
(3.899)
12.013
(17.471)
318.366
(310.946)
16.661
(944.331)
2,116.643**
(936.753)
519.896
(1,016.419)
-3,375.753*
(1,793.173)

Yes

Yes

167.891***
(3.916)
13.496
(17.501)
343.087
(311.329)
265.752
(959.153)
2,027.010**
(941.286)
719.692
(1,033.117)
-3,748.275**
(1,861.055)
-1,342.817
(1,194.298)
1,652.894
(1,388.235)
-1,213.602
(1,219.346)
3,368.159
(2,707.118)
566.315
(841.314)
Yes

3,455.124***
(1,043.218)

2,588.258**
(1,294.721)

2,363.366*
(1,329.084)

Brooklyn
Bronx
Queens
Staten Island
Firm - Brooklyn
Firm - Bronx
Firm - Queens
Firm – Staten Island
Firm – Not NYC
Firm Code Dummies
Constant

Observations
R-squared

4,120
4,120
0.321
0.324
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4,120
0.325

Table 5: This condensed table shows the Firm Code dummies condensed into one. The dummy
variables are all not statistically significant hence, it makes sense to have a condensed version of
them instead of having them listed.
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Regressions with Expanded Firm Code Dummy Variables
VARIABLES
Settlement Amount
Age
Open to Close

(1)
Payment

(2)
Payment

(3)
Payment

167.610***
(3.840)
8.560
(17.421)
308.890
(311.345)

168.161***
(3.899)
12.013
(17.471)
318.366
(310.946)
16.661
(944.331)
2,116.643**
(936.753)
519.896
(1,016.419)
-3,375.753*
(1,793.173)

-3,077.937
(4,751.589)
-969.389
(3,599.646)
-558.037
(3,018.339)
-117.524
(4,481.266)
-1,493.116
(3,967.389)
-1,153.334
(3,423.631)
-2,151.088
(5,727.714)
-1,879.377
(3,271.638)
-282.291

-2,456.986
(4,760.367)
-640.809
(3,604.107)
-1,230.520
(3,022.057)
-194.947
(4,476.598)
-1,147.971
(3,965.433)
-1,373.333
(3,419.745)
-2,363.069
(5,722.517)
-1,841.404
(3,267.943)
-277.642

167.891***
(3.916)
13.496
(17.501)
343.087
(311.329)
265.752
(959.153)
2,027.010**
(941.286)
719.692
(1,033.117)
-3,748.275**
(1,861.055)
-1,342.817
(1,194.298)
1,652.894
(1,388.235)
-1,213.602
(1,219.346)
3,368.159
(2,707.118)
566.315
(841.314)
-1,221.140
(4,852.958)
-259.072
(3,678.627)
83.390
(3,199.984)
-125.083
(4,487.069)
-1,122.009
(3,977.926)
20.525
(3,572.303)
-2,775.134
(5,755.516)
-471.101
(3,425.303)
-333.586

Brooklyn
Bronx
Queens
Staten Island
Firm - Brooklyn
Firm - Bronx
Firm - Queens
Firm - Staten Island
Firm - Not NYC
Firm Code 23
Firm Code 34
Firm Code 42
Firm Code 65
Firm Code 131
Firm Code 132
Firm Code 159
Firm Code 164
Firm Code 213

29

Firm Code 222
Firm Code 225
Firm Code 414
Firm Code 440
Firm Code 470
Firm Code 481
Firm Code 541
Firm Code 680
Firm Code 772
Firm Code 773
Firm Code 780
Firm Code 801
Firm Code 803
Firm Code 808
Firm Code 923
Firm Code 978
Firm Code 1125
Firm Code 1276
Firm Code 1511
Constant

Observations
R-squared

(2,340.006)
-2,487.396
(3,885.544)
-2,132.259
(7,745.349)
-1,710.175
(3,270.151)
-1,780.079
(4,256.582)
-2,551.023
(4,614.212)
-2,340.821
(2,559.624)
-2,293.041
(2,173.126)
-2,416.162
(5,482.116)
-1,122.587
(3,543.205)
199.351
(2,122.625)
-2,285.672
(3,097.380)
-1,968.987
(4,621.846)
-918.812
(3,268.831)
-1,693.826
(3,015.338)
-2,061.757
(4,609.241)
-1,680.721
(5,267.913)
-2,019.624
(3,179.936)
-1,578.191
(4,254.025)
-1,750.014
(3,176.397)
3,455.124***
(1,043.218)

(2,338.541)
1,079.254
(4,122.031)
-3,576.503
(7,746.912)
-955.545
(3,275.900)
-1,561.091
(4,273.605)
-2,679.723
(4,609.456)
-2,906.539
(2,560.575)
-2,228.615
(2,171.030)
-2,437.615
(5,475.480)
-1,085.778
(3,542.602)
348.099
(2,120.499)
-1,779.107
(3,100.541)
-1,209.266
(4,633.242)
-1,062.988
(3,265.456)
-1,541.251
(3,012.166)
-2,277.307
(4,607.870)
-1,743.831
(5,264.151)
-1,962.285
(3,177.484)
-1,458.737
(4,258.305)
-1,892.856
(3,173.022)
2,588.258**
(1,294.721)

4,120
4,120
0.321
0.324
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(2,348.333)
-1,874.881
(4,685.479)
-3,364.770
(7,752.725)
395.754
(3,420.424)
-423.504
(4,383.327)
-2,544.819
(4,620.158)
-2,809.786
(2,581.844)
-2,197.787
(2,196.908)
-2,986.284
(5,508.060)
-945.134
(3,558.738)
409.596
(2,145.906)
-484.554
(3,256.325)
10.695
(4,727.076)
-1,571.229
(3,323.318)
-1,533.020
(3,029.911)
-1,933.305
(4,636.380)
-536.171
(5,346.221)
-1,960.760
(3,195.309)
-298.404
(4,374.528)
-1,849.610
(3,189.657)
2,363.366*
(1,329.084)
4,120
0.325

Table 6: This extended table shows the Firm Code dummy variables. They are all not
statistically significant however, for reference purposes they are listed.
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Probit Regressions
(1)
Recoupment

(2)
Recoupment

(3)
Recoupment

(4)
Recoupment

(5)
Recoupment

(6)
Recoupment

0.019***
(0.000)
0.009***
(0.001)
0.232***
(0.014)

0.019***
(0.001)
0.009***
(0.001)
0.252***
(0.014)
-0.222***
(0.045)
-0.003
(0.046)
-0.390***
(0.057)
-0.371***
(0.077)

0.007***
(0.000)
0.003***
(0.000)
0.083***
(0.005)

0.007***
(0.000)
0.003***
(0.000)
0.088***
(0.005)
-0.079***
(0.016)
-0.001
(0.017)
-0.137***
(0.017)
-0.131***
(0.026)

0.009***
(0.000)
0.003***
(0.000)
0.085***
(0.005)
-0.072***
(0.016)
-0.002
(0.016)
-0.120***
(0.017)
-0.102***
(0.029)
-0.053*
(0.014)
-0.077***
(0.020)
-0.109***
(0.015)
-0.074
(0.034)
0.037***
(0.014)

Constant

-0.989***
(0.042)

-0.869***
(0.057)

0.027***
(0.001)
0.009***
(0.001)
0.251***
(0.014)
-0.208***
(0.047)
-0.006
(0.047)
-0.354***
(0.049)
-0.297***
(0.087)
-0.154*
(0.043)
-0.228***
(0.062)
-0.326***
(0.045)
-0.219
(0.102)
0.104***
(0.039)
-0.874***
(0.583)

Observations

9,521

9,521

9,521

VARIABLES
Settlement Amount
Age
Open to Close
Brooklyn
Bronx
Queens
Staten Island
Firm- Brooklyn
Firm- Bronx
Firm- Queens
Firm- Staten Island
Firm- Not in NYC

9,521
9,521
9,521
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7: Probit regressions of Recoupment on the log of settlement amount. Recoupment is a
binary variable which equals 1 if the respondent received a recoupment and 0 otherwise. Model
(2) includes client borough identifiers and Model (3) includes client borough identifiers as well
as firm location identifiers. Models (4)-(6) are the average marginal effects of the first three
models respectively.
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Heckman Regression
VARIABLES
Settlement Amount
Age
Open to Close
Brooklyn
Bronx
Queens
Staten Island
Firm- Brooklyn
Firm- Bronx
Firm- Queens
Firm- Staten Island
Firm- Not in NYC
Constant

Observations

(1)
Payment

(2)
Recoupment

(3)
AME on Recoupment

150.597***
(5.210)
-132.650***
(19.324)
-3247.633***
(348.232)
2299.103**
(1095.32)
896.706
(1088.554)
4463.201***
(1164.395)
1329.962
(2057.961)
2758.722***
(1062.947)
4976.771***
(1519.248)
5235.746***
(1144.461)
6420.715**
(2561.631)
-724.226
(1470.157)
29260.29***
-1470.157

0.029***
(0.000)
0.006***
(0.000)
0.190***
(0.014)
-0.100**
(0.043)
0.050
(0.043)
-0.234***
(0.046)
-0.122
(0.080)
-0.134***
(0.041)
-0.206***
(0.059)
-0.271***
(0.043)
-0.236**
(0.097)
0.087**
(0.037)

0.010***
(0.000)
0.002***
(0.000)
0.063***
(0.004)
-0.033**
(0.015)
0.017
(0.015)
-0.077***
(0.015)
-0.041
(0.026)
-0.045***
(0.013)
-0.068***
(0.019)
-0.088***
(0.014)
-0.077**
(0.030)
0.030**
0.013

9,521
9,521
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

9,521

Table 8: Heckman regressions using Payment and Recoupment. Recoupment is a binary variable
which equals 1 if the respondent received a recoupment and 0 otherwise. Payment is measured in
dollar amounts. Model (1) shows the regression on Payment. Model (2) shows the probit
regression on Recoupment and Model (3) shows the average marginal effects of Model (2).
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Two-Stage Heckman Regression
VARIABLES
Settlement Amount
Age
Open to Close
Brooklyn
Bronx
Queens
Staten Island
Firm- Brooklyn
Firm- Bronx
Firm- Queens
Firm- Staten Island
Firm- Not in NYC
Constant

Observations

(1)
Payment

(2)
Recoupment

(3)
AME on Recoupment

139.946***
(5.843)
-60.532***
(20.938)
-1940.972***
(443.876)
1682.600
(1039.428)
1665.107*
(1007.007)
3001.691**
(1138.168)
-1708.721
1975.526
1175.214
(1064.811)
4041.988***
(1468.129)
2681.113**
(1213.498)
5900.166**
(2513.721)
-64.8643
(854.6039)
19069.75
-2597.675

0.017***
(0.000)
0.010***
(0.001)
0.255***
(0.014)
-0.193***
(0.046)
0.009
(0.046)
-0.337***
(0.048)
-0.288***
(0.086)
-0.175***
(0.042)
-0.230***
(0.061)
-0.345***
(0.045)
-0.234**
(0.101)
0.098**
(0.039)
-0.828***
(0.058)

0.006***
(0.000)
0.003***
(0.000)
0.089***
(0.005)
-0.068***
(0.016)
0.003
(0.017)
-0.118***
(0.017)
-0.101***
(0.029)
-0.062***
(0.015)
-0.080***
(0.021)
-0.118***
(0.015)
-0.081**
(0.034)
0.035**
(0.014)

9,521

9,521

9,521

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 9: Two Stage Heckman regressions using Payment and Recoupment. Recoupment is a
binary variable which equals 1 if the respondent received a recoupment and 0 otherwise.
Payment is measured in dollar amounts. Model (1) shows the regression on Payment. Model (2)
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